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Introduction 
  FMD is a highly contagious disease affecting cloven hoofed animals.  An 
outbreak of FMD usually creates great economic damage.  Accordingly, sanitary policy 
in importing countries is intended to avoid the introduction of FMD as a result of 
imported beef. During the second half of the 20th century, countries with endemic FMD 
were unable to export beef to countries that were FMD free unless the beef had been 
processed to inactivate the virus. The sanitary policy under which FMD free countries 
barred beef imports from countries with FMD was known as “zero tolerance” for FMD. 
As a result of the frequently severe restrictions on beef from FMD endemic countries, 
international beef markets were largely divided into an FMD free segment and an FMD 
endemic segment.  Prices in the former were believed to be as much as 50 percent higher 
as in the latter (Jarvis, 1986; De las Carreras, 1993, 1995).   
A number of FMD endemic countries, particularly Argentina and Uruguay, 
sought to eradicate FMD during the 1980s and 1990s to gain access to FMD free markets 
and their higher prices.  Both countries succeeded in eradicating FMD in the late 1990s 
and temporarily gained access to the major FMD free markets in the Pacific Rim (US, 
Canada, Mexico, Japan and South Korea).
1  Contrary to expectation, anecdotal evidence 
from exporters suggests that export prices rose in each countries by only 10-15 percent 
(Bervejillo and Jarvis).  The magnitude of these price increases suggests that the price 
                                                 
1 Each country suffered new outbreaks of FMD in late 2000 and 2001.  Uruguay is now FMD free with 
vaccination, while Argentina is free with vaccination in its most important beef producing areas. 
  1differential between the FMD free and FMD endemic markets was lower than expected. 
While the shift in exports from the FMD endemic to the FMD free segments that 
occurred when Argentina and Uruguay gained access to FMD free markets might have 
somewhat lowered the pre-existing differential, the shift in exports seems too small to 
have reduced the differential so dramatically, judging from previous studies analyzing 
this possibility (e.g., Rae et al., Ekboir, et al.).  However, during the last decade, a 
number of FMD free importing countries have adopted a sanitary policy allowing greater 
latitude for beef imports from countries in which FMD is being controlled by vaccination 
and this may also be a factor. 
  Traditionally, beef from countries that were vaccinating against FMD was not 
accepted in countries that were FMD free. However, by 1977 the European Union (EU) 
was accepting matured boneless beef from some countries where FMD had not been 
eradicated, provided there were no current outbreaks in the exporting country, all animals 
were dutifully inspected at slaughter, and beef was processed following accepted 
guidelines.  This  “minimum risk” sanitary policy had been adopted by the United 
Kingdom several years before (De las Carreras, 1993).  The policy was based on 
scientific research showing that FMD virus can be carried in the bone and some other 
parts of a dead animal, but not in the muscle, since the pH of the muscle decreases 
naturally after death, inactivating the virus. The EU also began to accept beef from 
animals vaccinated against FMD, though it is clinically impossible with existing tests to 
differentiate between the antibodies in animals that have been infected with FMD as 
opposed to those vaccinated against FMD.  The EU experienced no outbreaks as a result 
  2of importing such beef.  The US then agreed to import beef under similar conditions 
during the Uruguay Round (Smith), as did Canada and several other importers.   
  The US provided Argentina and Uruguay with small tariff quotas in the mid 
1990s.  Additional beef could be imported at above quota tariff rates. After the 
2001outbreak of FMD in the Southern Cone and the re-introduction of vaccination as a 
method for control, the U.S. and Canada stopped importing beef from the region.   
However, the U.S. and Canada resumed imports of Uruguayan beef once the country was 
judged free of disease outbreaks, even though Uruguay continued to vaccinate.   This 
shows that under certain conditions large importers such as Canada and the US are now 
willing to accept beef from countries with ongoing vaccination against FMD. Under the 
regionalization principle accepted  by US and Canada during the Uruguay Round, 
Argentina and Brazil may also gain access to those markets if they demonstrate that they 
can secure a region where vaccination is still practiced but where FMD outbreaks have 
not occurred for some time and where sanitary controls are in compliance with the 
importer nation requirements. Despite the presence of FMD in the northern states and the 
continued vaccination in all major beef exporting states, with the exception of Santa 
Catarina where vaccination has been banned, Brazil emerged as a leading beef exporter 
after 2000.  These changes make it seem more likely that the price differential between 
the FMD free and FMD endemic markets could have shrunk.  
  Diakosavvas and Dries and Unnevehr found evidence of growing price co-
integration in international beef markets, and Jarvis, Bervejillo and Cancino show that the 
prices of bone-in beef and boneless beef have been converging over the last two decades. 
When comparing the prices of FMD free (Australia and New Zealand) and FMD endemic 
  3(Brazil and Uruguay) beef whose other characteristics appear similar, they also found 
evidence of price convergence, suggesting that the FMD differential has been shrinking.   
However, none of these studies specifically analyzed the effect of FMD on beef export 
prices.   
  This paper develops and uses a two step quantitative model to analyze the effect 
of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) on international beef markets over time.  Using 
monthly data from 1990-2002 for 7 major beef exporters and for 22 major beef importers, 
we use a probit equation to estimate the probability that country i exports to country j, 
taking account of foot and mouth status of exporter, sanitary policy of importer, beef 
quality, trade preferences, distance, and other factors affecting whether beef trade occurs. 
We then use OLS to estimate the export prices that are obtained for beef, taking account 
of beef quality, country population, trading preferences, region, per capita income, and a 
time trend, including terms to adjust for censorship in the first stage.   Using the 
estimated equations, we compare the predicted change in trading partners and in the 
prices received by the two exporters in our sample that are not FMD free, Brazil and 
Uruguay, under the assumption that their status switches from having FMD to being 
FMD free.  The model performs well.  The results suggest that FMD continues to impede 
trade between many countries and does accordingly reduce the price received for beef 
from countries with FMD. Nonetheless, the “sanction” from FMD appears smaller than 
previously believed.   
Approach 
Previous studies analyzing the effect of FMD on international beef trade have 
relied primarily on a simple comparison of the prices of beef exports from countries that 
  4are FMD free as opposed to FMD endemic (e.g., Jarvis; de las Carreras, 1993, 1995) to 
determine the price sanction, or on the inclusion of a dummy for FMD status of exporter 
as a determinant of the amount of beef traded between exporter and importer pairs (Koo, 
Karemera and Taylor).  We are not aware of any effort to utilize regression analysis to 
determine the effect of FMD on export prices.   
Our approach differs in several important respects.  We utilize a two step process 
to estimate the effect that FMD status has on, first, the probability that trade occurs 
between exporter and importer pairs, and, second, conditional on trade occurring, on the 
price received in the markets to which beef is exported. Since FMD is not harmful to 
humans, one can hypothesize that consumers should be concerned only with quality 
characteristics other than the FMD status of the exporter. If so, the presence of FMD in 
an exporting country should impede access to foreign markets, but not affect the price at 
which beef of comparable quality sells when access is achieved.  The price effect can 
then be measured by determining whether there is a significant differential between the 
price at which beef is sold in markets to which access is possible, given the presence of 
FMD, versus the price at which the same beef could be sold in markets to which access 
would be possible if FMD were absent.   
We further hypothesize that, since exporting countries have exhibited different 
degrees of FMD “presence” and importing countries have imposed differing sanitary 
policies in the recent period, the effect of FMD on the probability that trade occurs 
between exporter and importer pairs is likely to vary according to specific exporter status 
and importer sanitary policy, i.e., in a more subtle manner than usually considered.  If so, 
there is a potential gain to an exporter from reducing the perceived “infectious” quality of 
  5its beef, even if an FMD presence remains in the country.  Similarly, there is a potential 
welfare gain to an importer who adopts a less restrictive sanitary policy, assuming that 
the policy adopted is equally effective in excluding FMD.  
FMD status of exporter is included in the second stage to test the hypothesis that 
FMD has no independent impact on price as opposed to market access.  Even if FMD 
presents no risk to humans, consumers or their importing agents could value beef less if 
they know of and are concerned about FMD as an aspect of quality.  Alternatively, FMD 
status could be negatively correlated with unobserved quality differentials.  For example, 
the historical presence of FMD could affect quality and this lower quality could be 
reflected in lower export prices.   
Data Overview 
Data was obtained for the seven major beef exporters regarding their export flows 
(quantum) and export receipts with each of their major trading partners.
2  The exporters 
and importers, along with their respective FMD status and/or sanitary policy during the 
period of analysis is shown in Table 1.
3  The number of trading partners per exporter 
ranged from 3 for Canada to 11 for Brazil.  Collectively, and excluding EU intra bloc 
trade, these countries accounted for about 90  percent of world fresh beef trade in 2002. 
Beef is a heterogeneous product, with its unit value varying according to animal genetics, 
production technology, specific cut, whether it is sold bone in or boneless, and whether 
                                                 
2  Sources of monthly data were: Statistics Canada, the Argentine Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, 
Pesca y Alimentación, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), the 
Brazilian Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, the European Union EUROSTAT 
database, the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), the Uruguayan Instituto Nacional de 
Carnes, and the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Some data are available online free of charge.  Other data 
can only be obtained via services that charge a fee for a customized data set.   
3 As monthly data are currently available for Argentina only for 1998-2002, it was excluded from this 
analysis.  We hope additional data will become available soon, permitting Argentina’s inclusion in 
subsequent analysis. 
  6fresh/chilled or frozen.  Although most trade in beef 40 years ago was in carcass form, 
nearly all trade today occurs in the form of specific cuts.  Different exporters sell 
different cuts to different importers, providing scope for variation in the observed price. 
We disaggregate beef trade according to four Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes: 
chilled bone-in cuts (HTS 020120), chilled boneless cuts (HTS 020130), frozen bone-in 
cuts (HTS 020220), and frozen boneless cuts (HTS 020230).
4 Efforts to further 
disaggregate beef by higher digit codes proved impossible because different countries use 
different codes for specific cuts, which are not uniform across countries.  We also attempt 
to adjust for beef that is grain fed as opposed to grass fed, as discussed below. 
Using monthly data, we calculated the implicit beef export price for each 
exporter’s beef products using the respective value of exports, divided by the total 
quantity of exports, as reported by each data source. Intra European Union trade was 
excluded. Each price series was deflated using the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI) for all 
commodities. On average, chilled boneless cuts are the most valuable, followed by 
chilled bone-in cuts, with frozen bone-in cuts and frozen boneless cuts the least valuable 
and nearly equal in value.  See Table 2.  Although utilizing the four HTS codes to 
identify quality differences in beef is an improvement relative to aggregating beef into a 
single category, there is still a wide range of implicit prices for each of the four 
categories, indicating significant within-category heterogeneity.
5   
                                                 
4 As little trade currently occurs in carcasses, the other two six digit HTS codes corresponding to carcasses 
(HTS 020110 and HTS 020210) were discarded.   
5 The very high and the very low implicit prices include outliers that are usually the result of unusual 
transactions, e.g., very high prices received for small shipments.  As these cases were rare and as there was 
no clear pattern among them, we chose to retain all observations. 
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importer (FMD sanitary policy, tariffs and quotas), exporter and importer trade 
agreements, beef type (grass or grain fed), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population, 
cattle stocks, and distance between main exporter and importer’s port. Table 3 defines the 
variables and Table 4 contains key summary statistics for the data set.  
The Model and Econometric Specifications 
  Prices are observed only when trade occurs. Because some countries do not trade, 
e.g., because they are too distant from each other or because FMD exists in the exporter 
and the importer will not import beef from exporters with FMD, we do not know the 
export prices that would occur if such trade occurred.  We estimate the FMD effect on 
international prices by using a proxy for what would be the price that an FMD endemic 
country would obtain in a non-accessible market, utilizing a two step process.  We first 
estimate a probit model to analyze the effect of FMD and other factors on whether 
country A exports to country B (probability of exporting equation).  We then utilize OLS 
to estimate beef export prices (beef price equation) as a function of beef quality, variables 
thought to capture the effect of unobserved export quality differences, and trade 
preferential agreements, taking into account the potential for sample selection bias. In 
estimating the second step equation, we use the method generalized by Vella-Verbeek for 
panel data. 
Probability of Export Equation 
Following Harris and Loundes, we assume that the country’s observed decision to 
export over time is the result of an exportability index, . This index can be viewed as 
*
it y
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index, which is not directly observed, will vary with country characteristics that affect 
both the domestic supply of and demand for beef exports in the specific country pair, . 




it υ . This error term comprises random time-invariant country effects, i ε , and 
random time and country variant effects,  , which are assumed to be independent across 
countries. This feature allows us to adequately account for any remaining unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries. Assuming that the exportability index is a linear function 
of each country’s characteristics, we can derive the following reduced form latent 
regression model for a exporting country to engage in trade in each period, 
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* ,                                                       (2) 
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. Since we do not directly observe the difference  , but only 
the realization of , such that the country exports if   and does not export 
otherwise, the selection criteria for each country is given by, 
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where Zit includes the exporter’s FMD status, the importer’s sanitary policy, and a 
number of variables that proxy other aspects of a reduced form net excess supply curve, 
e.g., GDP of exporter and of importer, human population of exporter and of importer, 
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assumption that demand varies for different types of beef and that the cost of 
transportation varies by bone in and boneless beef and for chilled vs. frozen beef), and 
trade agreements existing between pairs of exporters and importers.  
Denote ui as the T vector of  it υ  for country i. We assume 
) ' , 0 .( . . ~
2 2 I ii D I N ui η ε σ σ +                                                  (4) 
Hence, for any country, the inter-temporal correlation  ρ  between error terms in 
successive periods is constant, i.e.  ( ) s t corr is it ≠ ∀ + = =        ,
2 2
η ε σ σ υ υ ρ
2
ε σ . 
Beef Price Equation 
We assume that beef export price is a linear function of country characteristics 
such as beef quality, the exporter’s and the importer’s per capita GDP (which are 
correlated with the within-quality category price for both exporter and importer), trade 
agreements, a time trend, regional dummy, and FMD status.  Thus, 
it it it X p ω β + =                                                       (5) 
where  it i it ν µ ω + = , i (i ) denotes the country and   ( N , , 1K = t T t , , 1K = ) denotes the 
panel. In equation 5 the error term includes a time-invariant country-specific component, 
i µ , and a random time and country variant component,  it ν , which are assumed to be 
independent across countries. Denote wi as the T vector of  it ω  for country i. We assume 
) ' , 0 .( . . ~
2 2 I ii D I N wi ν µ σ σ +                                                  (6) 
The beef export participation decision rule (equation 3) selects countries into 
observed classes (either in or out of the beef export market). As a result, the prices 
actually observed are not random samples of the population, but are instead truncated 
  10non-random samples. Therefore, the price equation must be estimated conditional on the 
outcome of the selection process in order to take into account the sample selection bias. 
We follow the procedure adopted by Ridder, and Nijman and Verbeek and generalized by 
Vella and Verbeek for panel data. 
In the traditional Heckman two-step approach, to adjust for sample selection bias, 
the regression equation is augmented with an additional regressor that takes into account 
the correlation between the error terms in the probit and regression equations. In the 
panel data setting there are two error terms each in the probit and in the regression 
equations. Consequently two additional regressors (or bias correction terms) must be 
included. Consider the general form of censoring (the conditional expectations of the 
error terms in [4], given selection (i.e., positive exports)). The resulting bias in the 
observed means may be calculated as 
] 1 [ ] 1 [ ] 1 [
' = + = + = = it it it i it it it y E y E X y p E ν µ β                        (7) 
We assume that the regressors from the probability of exporting equation [2] are strictly 
exogenous (not correlated with the error components). Given estimates of (2), which are 
reported in table 5, estimates of the two correction terms in (7) are constructed by 
numerical integration (see Vera-Toscano, Phimister and Weersink for further details on 
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T
t it i T
1 / 1 ω ω ,  εµ σ  captures the correlation between the time-invariant country-
specific effects and  υν σ captures the covariance between the time-variant country-specific 
effects. The resulting estimated correction terms can be added to equation 5. We then 
estimate equation 5, including these correction terms, using OLS. The test for the 
significance of these terms is a test for non-response bias. This approach provides more 
economic insight into the processes driving the selection bias and helps identify the 
source of the heterogeneity (Jarvis and Vera-Toscano). Although two-step procedures are 
generally inefficient (Newey) the attraction of this approach, in contrast to maximum 
likelihood, is its relative computational ease. Further Vella and Verbeek’s method 
provides initial consistent estimators for a LIML approach so that asymptotically efficient 
estimators can be obtained in one iteration. 
Regression Results  
 
Probability of Export Equation 
 
We have an observation for each type of beef for each exporting country to each 
importing country in every month.  As many exporters and importers do not trade with 
each other, many observations are zero (no trade). There are 30,576 observations, with 
trade observed in 16,505 cases.  Although we observe trade in each of the four beef 
quality categories, there is significantly more trade in boneless cuts than in bone-in cuts, 
whether chilled or frozen.  See Table 2.   
  We initially estimated the first equation so that the independent variables had the 
same effect on country i’s decision to export to country j for each beef quality category.  
The estimated coefficients were nearly all as expected, but the model did not predict as 
well as desired.  The results suggested that the effect of most independent variables on 
  12the decision to export differed by beef quality category.  We thus re-specified the 
estimation equation accordingly. Unfortunately, we mistakenly omitted several terms.  
Although the results are good in terms of improving the model’s ability to predict, we are 
hopeful that the preferred specification would have produced still better results.  
Estimation requires substantial time for convergence to be achieved.  The version which 
we had hoped to report has been running for four days and we will not have time to report 
those results here.  We therefore report preliminary results from the earlier specification 
and plan to update the paper with results from other runs later.    
To help explain observed trade patterns, we included dummy variables for beef 
quality. These variables were expected to capture the 1) higher volume of trade in 
boneless as opposed to bone in beef cuts and 2) the lower cost and greater ability to ship 
beef that is frozen over longer distances. The omitted variable is HTS 020220, frozen 
bone-in beef. In the equation reported, the probability that trade occurs for beef in quality 
category 020220 is a function only of a constant term (it should also have been a function 
of each of the independent variables).  See Table 5.  The probability that trade occurs in 
quality category 020120 is again the same constant term, plus terms interacting each of 
the independent variables with the quality category 020120 (the probability that trade 
occurs in 020120 should have included the terms omitted for 020220). The probability 
that trade occurs in quality categories 020130 and 020230 should be specified as was 
category 020120.  The misspecification should produce poorer results, especially for 
category 020220.    
Each of the three beef quality dummy variables is highly significant.  The 
estimated coefficients indicate a higher probability of trade for chilled bone-in and for 
  13frozen bone-in, cet. par., than for chilled or frozen boneless cuts. These results have no 
normative significance.   
The effect of FMD on trade is captured through nine dummy variables.  FMD 
status of exporter is classified as FMD endemic, FMD free with vaccination and FMD 
free, denoted X1, X2 and X3, respectively.  Sanitary policy of importer is classified as 
zero tolerance, minimum risk, and open, denoted M1, M2 and M3, respectively.  These 
variables allow for nine combinations: X1M1, X1M2, X1M3, X2M1, X2M2, X2M3, 
X3M1, X3M2, and X3M3.  We do not have non-zero observations that fit the 
combination X2M1, so it is omitted. We then omit X1M1 and include the other seven 
combinations in the regression.  Only 1 is non-zero for each observation.   
We expected the probability of trade to be highest for exporters that are FMD 
free, regardless of the sanitary policy faced, as the FMD free exporters face no sanitary 
restrictions.  Exporters who are FMD free with vaccination should not export to importers 
with a policy of zero tolerance.  We indeed observed no such trade.  Exporters that are 
FMD endemic should not export to importers with a policy of zero tolerance or minimum 
risk and thus the coefficients on X3M1 and X3M2 should also be large, negative and 
highly significant.  The coefficients for the other FMD dummy variables have no 
particular importance, but are expected to be of ambiguous sign and probably not highly 
significant.  
The results are partially consistent with expectations, but the lack of greater 
consistency may be due to the misspecification.  In earlier regressions, the coefficients 
estimated on the FMD dummy variables followed expectations very closely.  In this case, 
the coefficients on X1M2 are positive, large and highly significant, while the coefficients 
  14on X3M1 are negative and, for two categories, large and statistically significant.  
However, two of the coefficients on X3M2 are positive and statistically significant, 
which was unexpected. This may also be a problem of lags, since for example, Uruguay 
was exporting to the US when FMD broke out in 2000 and imports received in 
subsequent months are occurring when it was classified as FMD endemic, though it 
probably was not when the shipments began.  Sixteen of 21 estimated coefficients are 
highly significant, indicating that FMD status is a major determinant of the probability of 
trade between countries. 
We include distance from the main port of exporter to the main port of importer 
as a proxy for the cost of transportation, with greater distance expected to reduce the 
probability of trade.  The square of distance is also included to account for expected-
nonlinear effects. The coefficients on distance and on the square of distance are highly 
significant, but not necessarily of expected sign.   
We include cattle stock of the exporter and of the importer.  We assume that a 
higher cattle stock for the exporter will increase the probability of trade and a higher 
cattle stock for the importer will reduce the probability of trade.  The coefficient on 
exporter cattle stock is negative and significant, while the coefficient on importer cattle 
stock is positive and mainly significant.  Neither result is expected.  In earlier regressions, 
both results were reversed.   
We included several additional variables to help explain trade and thus reduce the 
likelihood of specification bias for the estimated coefficients on the FMD status 
variables.  These variables are GNP of exporter and of importer, and population of 
exporter and of importer. The expected signs of these variables are not a priori clear.  For 
  15example, a high exporter GNP could signify high domestic demand and thus a lower 
probability of trade, or a well developed beef industry that is more capable of supplying 
beef cuts that are desired by other countries.   
The estimated rho, the inter-temporal correlation between error terms in 
successive periods, is positive and highly significant, indicating the importance of 
adjusting for such correlation.   
Table 6 shows the matrix of correct and incorrect predictions.  The first stage 
equation predicts correctly 79 percent of the time, with approximately equal proportional 
error across the four categories.  Thus, although the specification omits several terms, it 
predicts trade well.  The original specification for the first stage equation produced 
coefficients that were nearly all as expected, but as it did not predict trade as well, we 
have not used it here.  
Beef Price Regression  
The second stage equation attempt to explain the price of beef received by 
different exporters in different import markets.  The equation is specified as follows:  
P = f(beef quality, time trend, exporter per capita GDP, importer per capita 
GDP, interaction terms for beef quality and per capita GDP, a proxy for grain fed as 
opposed to grass fed beef, and a series of dummy variables reflecting regional 
conditions). 
The predicted price for beef quality category 020220 is determined by using all of 
the estimated parameters in the fourth column.  The predicted price for the other three 
beef quality categories are determined by using all of the estimated parameters in the 
  16fourth column as well (these terms affect the predicted price for each category), plus the 
estimated coefficients columns under the columns for each respective category.   
We include a time trend to capture the well-known, longer-term tendency for the 
price of beef to decline (Delgado, et al).  The estimated coefficient is negative and highly 
significant, as expected.  
We hypothesized that grain fed beef would receive a higher price than grass fed 
beef.  In part, this hypothesis was based on the expectation that grain fed beef was more 
costly and, at least in the US, Canada, Japan and Korea, was thought to receive higher 
prices.  We also had noticed in a previous study that US export prices were consistently 
higher than those of any other exporter and we attributed this, at least in part, to the grain 
fed nature of US beef exports.  We lack the ability to determine directly whether a 
specific shipment of beef is grain fed and instead proxy this quality by assuming that all 
beef exported from the US and from Canada is grain fed.  We recognize that some beef 
from other countries is also grain fed.  For example, approximately 30 percent of 
Australia’s beef production and 25 percent of exports are of grain fed beef. Almost all of 
Australian exports of grain-fed beef are shipped to Japan (USDA), but we are unable to 
capture this  by using HTS codes.  Similarly, some beef in Uruguay and Brazil is 
“finished” on grain, though only a small proportion are grain fed and the feeding period 
for those animals is very brief compared to that commonly used in the US.  With these 
strong caveats, we note that the empirical results do not support the hypothesis that grain 
fed beef receives a higher price. The coefficient on “beef exported from the US or from 
Canada (with export to Mexico excluded)” is consistently negative and statistically 
significant. 
  17We included a number of other terms intended to capture regional effects. Prices 
received for sales to the EU are significantly the highest, with prices in middle income 
Asia next and, somewhat surprisingly, prices in high income Asia somewhat lower.  
Exports to the US and to Canada are somewhat above average, but not high.  This may 
reflect the tendency to import manufacture beef, but of high quality with respect to other 
characteristics.  Exports to the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Uruguay) receive somewhat lower than average prices; this may occur because three of 
them are major beef exporters and all are members of the same free trade area. Beef 
exported to the other middle income countries also receives somewhat lower prices, 
presumably because they demand beef of lower quality. 
We expect that price should vary with beef quality. Table 7 defines the variables 
considered in the price equation. As shown in Table 8, the coefficients on the three beef 
quality dummy variables (“HTS”) are positive and highly significant, indicating that 
disaggregating according to beef quality category has the expected effect.   
The EU provides Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay each with a special quota for 
high quality cuts (020130), informally called the Hilton Quota as the beef is intended for 
purchase by restaurants and hotels. However, exports through the Hilton Quota are mixed 
in with general exports in the 020130 category and the estimated coefficient for Uruguay 
is negative, rather than positive as expected.  
The FMD status of the exporter was included to determine if FMD has a direct 
impact on price, independently of whether it affects the exporting country’s access to 
different markets.  The model indicates that FMD does have a strong negative direct 
effect, equal to 15 to 30 percent of the base price, for three of the categories.  FMD does 
  18not appear to have a direct price effect for category 020220; the coefficient is negative, 
but not significant.  
Because of the large price variation within each beef category, we include per 
capita income in exporter and in importer as a supply and a demand proxy to capture 
some of this variation.  We also interacted per capita GDP with beef quality to determine 
if the effects of income on quality varied by beef quality category.  In each case, the 
estimated coefficients are highly significant, though the signs vary from positive to 
negative.  The effort here is to improve the precision of the price prediction.  
  The two-step estimator for panel data selection breaks down the selection into 
two separate selection (correction) terms, a1i and a2it. The inclusion of the correction 
terms accounts for the endogeneity of the export (participation) decision and, as the 
decision not to export corresponds to zero price, their inclusion also accounts for the 
selection bias from estimating over the sub-sample with positive trade. The estimates of 
these parameters indicate whether the endogenous sample selection is due to time-
invariant (a1i) or time-variant (a2it) factors. Selection into the beef export market has a 
country specific component, a1i (which reflects export price differences across countries), 
and an “idiosyncratic” component, a2it (which reflects export price differences over time 
for a given country). Both correction terms are statistically significant, indicating that 
both forms of endogeneity/selectivity are present and, therefore, justify the approach 
followed. The positive sign on a1i indicates that the time-invariant unobserved country 
effects in the market participation and price equations are positively correlated (i.e. the 
unmeasured time-invariant factors that make countries more likely to export have a 
positive effect on the export price level). For example, if the random effects reflect 
  19unobserved cultural links, these links will increase the probability of trade and increase 
the export price. The positive sign on a2it implies that over time, for a given country, the 
time-varying factors that increase the probability of trade make the exporter likely to face 
a higher export price. For example, if the random effects reflect an unobserved 
improvement in quality that increases the probability of trade, it has increased the export 
price as well. 
The overall fit of the equation is good for this sort of equation, with the adjusted 
R
2 being 0.33.   
Prediction and Simulation 
  Based on the estimated probability of export and beef export price equations, we 
concluded that FMD status has a negative impact on the probability of export and the 
beef export price. We seek to predict the effect of FMD on trade flows and international 
beef prices.  In this study, we cannot estimate the equilibrium effects of changes in trade.  
However, previous studies generally have not had good impact estimates of how changes 
in exporting country FMD status (or in the sanitary policy of importing countries) might 
initially change market flows.  We utilize the probability of exporting equation to predict 
trade flows, using exogenous variables as drivers of the results. Then, by assuming that 
Brazil and Uruguay, the main two exporting countries in our sample that are not FMD 
free, change their status to FMD free, we simulate the expected changes in trading 
relationships that result.  We can also obtain a first order approximation to the price 
effects of changes in FMD status by simulating the prices that would occur for Brazil and 
Uruguay if their FMD status changed, contingent on their new trading relationships.  The 
model simulates a price for each beef quality in each market in which each of the 
  20countries trade.  We compare the distribution of these prices and the average of these 
prices with a) those that actually occur and b) those that our model predicts should occur 
under actual circumstances when neither country is FMD free.  
The estimated equations were next used to quantitatively evaluate the difference 
between the prices obtained by traditionally FMD endemic countries (Brazil and 
Uruguay) under two scenarios: 1) Baseline scenario, where the probability of export 
equation was used to predict trade or no trade with their market destinations under their 
actual FMD status and the beef price equation was used to obtain the predicted price for 
all the exporter-importer combinations for which trade was predicted; and 2) FMD free 
scenario, in this case Brazil and Uruguay are considered as if they were FMD free. In the 
second scenario simulation, all probability determinants except Brazil and Uruguay’s 
FMD status were set equal to their actual levels. However, the FMD status was assumed 
to be FMD free and the corresponding export probability and export price were simulated 
over time. The difference between the average annual export prices obtained for the 
above two scenarios gives the estimated impact of gaining FMD free status on the beef 
export price for Brazil and Uruguay. 
The results are shown in Tables 9 and 10.  For simplicity, only the results for 
boneless cuts are presented.  These results predict that the gain from eradicating FMD are 
4 percent and 19 percent for Brazil, for chilled and frozen boneless cuts, respectively, and 
5 percent and 9 percent for Uruguay, for the same cuts.  These are relatively small gains, 
at least when compared to the price differences commonly attributed to the FMD 
endemic and FMD free market segments.  
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  The paper develops and uses a two step quantitative model to analyze the effect 
of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) on international beef markets over time.  Using 
monthly data from 1990-2002 for 7 major beef exporters and for 22 major beef importers, 
we use a probit equation to estimate the probability that country i exports to country j, 
taking account of foot and mouth status of exporter, sanitary policy of importer, beef 
quality, trade preferences, distance, and other factors affecting whether beef trade occurs. 
We then use OLS to estimate the export prices that are obtained for beef, taking account 
of beef quality, country per capita, trading preferences, region, per capita income, and a 
time trend, including terms to adjust for censorship in the first stage.   Using the 
estimated equations, we compare the predicted change in trading partners and in the 
prices received by the two exporters in our sample that are not FMD free, Brazil and 
Uruguay, under the assumption that their status switches from having FMD to being 
FMD free.  The model performs well.  The results suggest that FMD continues to impede 
trade between many countries and does accordingly reduce the price received for beef 
from countries with FMD. Nonetheless, the “sanction” from FMD appears smaller than 
previously believed.   
These results warrant careful interpretation. Although we are pleased with the 
model’s apparent ability to predict both trade between exporters and importers and the 
prices in different import markets, the results are static, not dynamic.  For example, the 
model may predict that country i will export to a different set of importing countries 
following a change in FMD status, with the prediction being based on parameters that 
have been estimated from the existing set of trading relationships.  The model does not 
  22allow for subsequent adjustment if the underlying parameters change as trading 
relationships change.   
Similarly, the estimated price sanction caused by the existence of FMD in an 
exporting country is calculated as the difference between an average of all prices in the 
predicted trading sets for that country, assuming the country changes FMD status, plus 
the removal of the FMD price sanction in the beef price equation.  However, even if a 
country were to change is trading relationships as predicted, it need not export the same 
amount to each trading partner.  We would expect that it would export more to those 
markets in which a higher price is received.  Nonetheless, we note that exports to the very 
high priced markets among current trading relationships are usually constrained by trade 
barriers, e.g., quotas or tariff quotas.  Thus, the use of an average predicted price received 
among trading partners may not be a bad approximation of the actual price received. 
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  26Table 1. List of exporters and importers, along with their respective FMD status 
and/or sanitary policy 1990-2002 
Country  Actual or assumed FMD status  Sanitary policy on 
imports 
Exporters 
Australia  Free (Whole period)  n/a 
New Zealand  Free (Whole period)  n/a 
Exporters/Importers 
Brazil  Endemic (Jan-1990 to May-2000), Free with 
vaccination (Jun-2000 to Dec-2002) 
Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
Canada  Free (Whole period) 
Zero risk (Jan-1990 to 
Apr-1994), Minimum 
risk (May-1994 to Dec-
2002) 
EU  Endemic (Jan-1990 to Dec-1990), Free (Jan-1991 to 
Dec-2002) 
Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
USA  Free (Whole period) 
Zero risk (Jan-1990 to 
Apr-1994), Minimum 
risk (May-1994 to Dec-
2002) 
Uruguay 
Endemic (Jan-1990 to Apr-1993; Aug-2000 to Nov-
2000; May-2001 to Dec-2002), free with vaccination 
(May-1993 to April 95), free (May-1995 to Apr-2001)
Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
Importers 
Algeria   Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Argentina 
Endemic (Jan-1990 to Apr-2000; Aug-2000 to Oct-
2000; Mar-2001 to Dec-2002),  Free (May-2000 to 
Feb-2001) 
Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
Chile  Free (Whole period)  Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
Egypt  Endemic (All period)  None 
Hong Kong   Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Iran  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Israel  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Japan   Free (Whole period)  Zero risk (Whole period)
Korea  Free (Whole period)  Zero risk (Whole period)
Malaysia  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Mexico  Free (Whole period)  Zero risk (Whole period)
Philippines  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Russia  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Saudi Arabia  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Singapore  Endemic (Whole period)  Minimum risk (Whole 
period) 
South Africa  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
Taiwan  Free (Jan-1990 to Dec-1996), Endemic (Jan-1997 to 
Dec-2002)  
 Zero risk (Whole 
period) 
Turkey  Endemic (Whole period)  None 
  27Table 2. Key Beef Export Price Characteristics ($/Metric Ton) 
Type of Beef  Mean  Standard 
Deviation Variance Minimum Maximum Number of 
observations
Chilled bone-in (020120)  3,673.4  2,345.0  5,499,204.6 239.8  25,567.6  2,839 
Chilled boneless (020130) 4,282.6  2,424.2  5,876,515.0 261.7  31,891.5  4,237 
Frozen bone-in (020220)  2,650.5  1,801.6  3,245,738.7 123.4  17,514.5  3,665 
Frozen boneless (020230) 2,613.9  1,388.9  1,928,959.9 125.2  24,025.9  5,764 
All  categories  3,232.6 2,091.3 4,373,513.1 123.4  31,891.5  16,505 
 
  28Table 3. Key Sample Characteristics: variable definition and units 
Variable  Definition and units 
Q120  Dummy=1 if HTS=020120 
Q130  Dummy=1 if HTS=020130 
Q220  Dummy=1 if HTS=020220 
Q230  Dummy=1 if HTS=020230 
X1M2  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD free and importer applies minimum risk policy 
X1M3  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD free and importer FMD endemic 
X2M2  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD free with vaccination and importer applies minimum risk 
policy 
X2M3  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD free with vaccination and importer FMD endemic 
X3M1  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD endemic and importer applies zero risk policy 
X3M2  Dummy=1 if exporter FMD endemic and importer applies minimum risk policy 
X3M3  Dummy=1 if exporter and importer are FMD endemic 
WDIST  Distance between main exporter and importer port, Thousands nautical miles 
WDIST2  Distance square, Thousands squared nautical miles 
XGDP  Exporter GDP, Trillions US$ 
MGDP  Importer GDP, Trillions US$ 
XPOP  Exporter population, Millions 
MPOP  Importer population, Millions 
XSTOCK  Exporter cattle stock, Millions 
MSTOCK  Importer cattle stock, Millions 
NAFTA  Dummy=1 if exporter and importer are members of NAFTA 
MERCOSUR Dummy=1 if exporter and importer are members of MERCOSUR 
JAPKORE0  Dummy=1 if importer is Japan or Korea 
JAPKORE  Dummy=1 if Australia, New Zealand or USA export to Japan or Korea 
HILTON  Dummy=1 if Brazil or Uruguay export HTS 020130 to EU 
 
  29Table 4. Key Sample Characteristics  
Variable Average  Standard  Deviation Variance  MinimumMaximum
Q120 0.25  0.43  0.19  0.00  1.00 
Q130 0.25  0.43  0.19  0.00  1.00 
Q220 0.25  0.43  0.19  0.00  1.00 
Q230 0.25  0.43  0.19  0.00  1.00 
X1M2 0.16 0.36  0.13  0.00  1.00 
X1M3 0.20 0.40  0.16  0.00  1.00 
X2M2 0.03 0.17  0.03  0.00  1.00 
X2M3 0.04 0.20  0.04  0.00  1.00 
X3M1 0.03 0.18  0.03  0.00  1.00 
X3M2 0.10 0.30  0.09  0.00  1.00 
X3M3 0.12 0.33  0.11  0.00  1.00 
WDIST 5.84  2.61  6.81  0.13  11.28 
WDIST2 40.95  31.68  1,003.32  0.02  127.24 
XGDP 2.13  3.31  10.94  0.01  10.38 
MGDP 1.91  2.95  8.68  0.03  10.38 
XPOP 120.73  133.44  17,806.10  3.11  379.74 
MPOP 99.54  102.29  10,462.76  3.05  379.74 
XSTOCK 65.53  61.41  3,771.24  8.03  185.35 
MSTOCK 26.98  38.71  1,498.77 0.00 185.35 
NAFTA 0.06  0.23  0.05  0.00  1.00 
MERCOSUR 0.05  0.23  0.05  0.00  1.00 
JAPKORE0 0.02  0.13  0.02  0.00  1.00 
JAPKORE 0.01  0.11  0.01  0.00  1.00 
HILTON 0.10  0.30  0.09 0.00  1.00 
 
  30Table 5.  Estimated Coefficients Random Effects Probit Estimation of Beef Export 
Market Participation. 
   Type of Beef 
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HILTON   2.424 
(0.000)    
        
ρ 
0.750 
(0.000)          
N=30,576; T=156         
p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
  31Table 6. Number and Percentage of Correct and Incorrect Predictions 
  Predicted trade  Predicted no trade
Actual trade  10,344 (33.8%)  6,161 (20.1%) 
Actual no trade  2,591 (8.5%)  11,480 (37.5%) 
 
  32Table 7.  Variable Definition for Beef Export Price Equation 
Variable  Definition and units 
CONSTANT Constant 
XPCGDP  Exporter per capita GDP, Thousand of US$) 
MPCGDP  Importer per capita GDP, Thousand of US$) 
TREND  Time trend, time index = 1 to156 
GRAINFED  Dummy =1 if exporter is Canada or USA (exports to Mexico are excluded) 
HIASIA  High income Asia Dummy =1 if importer is Japan, Korea or Taiwan 
MIASIA 
Middle income Asia Dummy =1 if importer is Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines 
or Singapore 
EURASIA 
Dummy =1 if importer is Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa or Turkey 
SCONE  Southern Cone Dummy =1 if importer is Argentina, Brazil or Chile 
EU  Dummy =1 if importer is EU-15 
CANUSA  Dummy =1 if importer is Canada or USA 
HILTON  Dummy =1 if Brazil or Uruguay export to EU and HS=20130 
HTS  Harmonized trade schedule 
FMD  Dummy =1 if exporter is FMD free or FMD free with vaccination 
FMD-HTS  Interaction FMD status and HTS 
XPCGDP-HTS Interaction exporter per capita income and HTS 
MPCGDP-HTS Interaction importer per capita income and HTS 
a1i  Country-specific sample correction parameter 
a2it  Country-specific overtime sample correction parameter 
 
 
  33Table 8.  Estimation of Beef Export Price Equation with Vella & Verbeek 
Correction 
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253.654 
(0.048) 
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102.818 
(0.000) 
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14.121 
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TREND      
-9.469 
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GRAINFED      
-175.921 
(0.000) 
HIASIA      
1058.321 
(0.000) 
MIASIA      
1590.391 
(0.000) 
EURASIA      
69.492 
(0.285) 
SCONE      
393.214 
(0.000) 
EU      
2584.438 
(0.000) 
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(0.000)   
        
a1i 
176.438 
(0.000)      
a2it 
370.738 
(0.000)      
        
R
2 0.327       
N 16,505       
p-values are in parenthesis. 
  34Table 9.  Predicted Price Effect from Eradicating FMD ($/Metric Ton): Brazil 
 Brazil 









free  Penalty% 
1990 4,777  4,839  -1%  *** 2,436  2,898  -16%  *** 
1991 4,675  4,737  -1%  *** 2,304  2,767  -17%  *** 
1992 4,596  4,657  -1%  *** 2,181  2,644  -18%  *** 
1993 4,457  4,538  -2%  *** 2,075  2,538  -18%  *** 
1994 4,152  4,461  -7%  *** 1,912  2,441  -22%  *** 
1995 3,991  4,412  -10% *** 1,789  2,352  -24%  *** 
1996 3,901  4,322  -10% *** 1,675  2,240  -25%  *** 
1997 3,793  4,214  -10% *** 1,595  2,158  -26%  *** 
1998 3,697  4,118  -10% *** 1,457  2,020  -28%  *** 
1999 3,580  4,001  -11% *** 1,289  1,853  -30%  *** 
2000 3,813  3,889  -2%  NS 1,514  1,749  -13%  *** 
2001 3,921  3,768 4%  *** 1,618  1,618  0%  NS 
2002 3,827  3,678 4%  *** 1,492  1,492  0%  NS 
All 4,091  4,280  -4%  *** 1,795 2,213  -19%  *** 
** and *** denote differences that are statistically different from zero at the 5% and 1% level; NS denotes 
statistically insignificant. All corresponds to the average for 1990-2002. 
  35Table 10.  Predicted Price Effect from Eradicating FMD ($/Metric Ton): Uruguay 
 Uruguay 









free  Penalty% 
1990 4,599  5,020  -8%  *** 2,243  2,641  -15%  *** 
1991 4,508  4,929  -9%  *** 2,145  2,542  -16%  *** 
1992 4,437  4,858  -9%  *** 2,123  2,440  -13%  *** 
1993 4,308  4,722  -9%  *** 2,216  2,346  -6% *** 
1994 4,336  4,596  -6%  *** 2,250  2,250  0%  NS 
1995 4,387  4,464  -2%  *** 2,144  2,144  0%  NS 
1996 4,329  4,329 0%  NS 2,042  2,042  0%  NS 
1997 4,057  4,057 0%  NS 1,941  1,941  0%  NS 
1998 3,964  3,964 0%  NS 1,836  1,836  0%  NS 
1999 3,999  3,999 0%  NS 1,703  1703  0%  NS 
2000 3,706  3,853  -4%  *** 1,368  1,575  -13% ** 
2001 3,340  3,621  -8%  *** 1,063  1,475  -28%  *** 
2002 3,092  3,513  -12% *** 649  1,275  -49%  *** 
All 4,082  4,306  -5%  *** 1,825 2,016  -9%  *** 
** and *** denote differences that are statistically different from zero at the 5% and 1% level; NS denotes 
statistically insignificant. All corresponds to the average for 1990-2002. 
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